Art. XI, Section 1

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 51 OLR 44 (1971); 37 WLR 469 (2001); 40 WLR 225 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 2

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Formation of corporations

A local government boundary commission is not a corporation. River Rd. Water Dist. v. Eugene, 8 Or App 290, 492 P2d 812 (1972), Sup Ct review denied

A legally insufficient description of a city’s boundaries in its municipal charter does not affect the validity of the charter. City of Idanha v. Consumers Power, Inc., 8 Or App 551, 495 P2d 294 (1972)

1977 amendments to ORS chapter 268, which limited applicability of chapter to statutorily defined area within boundaries of Clackamas, Multnomah and Washington Counties and precluded formation of additional metropolitan service districts in state, did not create corporation by special law in violation of this section. Reilley v. Secretary of State, 288 Or 573, 607 P2d 162 (1980)

Because this section does not prohibit legislature from creating entity with some corporate attributes for a statewide public purpose and subject to statewide management and control, chapter 829, Oregon Laws 1979, creating SAIF, is not unconstitutional. State ex rel Eckles v. Livermore, 72 Or App 650, 696 P2d 1153 (1985), aff’d State ex rel Eckles v. Woolley, 302 Or 37, 726 P2d 918 (1986)

SAIF Corporation’s exclusively governmental management and absence of private investment or objective to operate for private profit suffice to exclude it from class of corporations to which prohibition of this section was addressed. State ex rel Eckles v. Woolley, 302 Or 37, 726 P2d 918 (1986)

Home rule generally

This section made available to cities all of the powers which the legislature could validly confer upon them. City of Idanha v. Consumers Power, Inc., 8 Or App 551, 495 P2d 294 (1972)

A home rule city’s power to act must be founded in its charter as well as in the Oregon Constitution. City of Beaverton v. Intl. Assn. of Fire Fighters, 20 Or App 293, 531 P2d 730 (1975), Sup Ct review denied

Public Employe Relations Board is not authorized under ORS 243.772 to invalidate local legislation if by so doing it would deprive home rule cities of power to legislate on matters in which their interest as distinguished from state’s is paramount; such interpretation of ORS 243.772 would be unconstitutional. City of Beaverton v. Intl. Assn. of Fire Fighters, 20 Or App 293, 531 P2d 730 (1975), Sup Ct review denied

Retirement and life insurance benefits for police officers and firemen are matters of predominantly state concern, rather than local concern. LaGrande/Astoria v. Public Employes Retirement Board, 281 Or 137, 576 P2d 1204 (1978)

This section, providing that the “Legislative Assembly shall not enact, amend, or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town,” did not deny legislature authority to enact statewide standards for police and firefighters retirement and insurance benefits. LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 284 Or 173, 586 P2d 765 (1978)

Since Public Employe Collective Bargaining Act (ORS 243.650 to 243.782) is general law addressed primarily to substantive social, economic and other regulatory objectives of the state which do not affect freedom of local community to choose its own political form, it does not mandate structural and organizational arrangements of local governments contrary to this section. City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Firefighters, 292 Or 266, 639 P2d 90 (1981)

City ordinance that provides for confiscation of weapon “possessed, carried or used unlawfully by the owner” is not inconsistent with state statute that provides same penalty when weapon is used in commission of felony or misdemeanor and is being unlawfully carried. City of Portland v. Marshall, 82 Or App 497, 728 P2d 903 (1986), Sup Ct review denied

Where city’s mandatory minimum penalty is harsher than state’s for same conduct, penalty is invalid under this section as incompatible with state criminal law. City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or 490, 714 P2d 220 (1986)

Tri-Met’s issuance of final order pursuant to Oregon Laws 1991, chapter 3, creating Westside Corridor Project, and LUBA’s affirmation thereof did not deprive affected local governments of their Home Rule rights. Seto v. Tri-County Metro. Transportation Dist., 311 Or 456, 814 P2d 1060 (1991)

Test for preemption is whether local ordinance permits or prohibits what statute treats in opposite way, unless there is clear statutory intent to contrary. State v. Lopez-Vega, 111 Or App 252, 826 P2d 48 (1992); City of Portland v. Jackson, 316 Or 148, 850 P2d 1093 (1993)

City or town authority to amend its charter is subject to plenary authority of state legislature and to regulatory authority of metropolitan service district under section 14, Article XI of Oregon Constitution. City of Sandy v. Metro, 200 Or App 481, 115 P3d 960 (2005)

Oregon Residential and Landlord Tenant Act does not implicitly preempt city ordinances that impose additional or stricter requirements on landowners. Thunderbird Mobile Club v. City of Wilsonville, 234 Or App 457, 228 P3d 650 (2010), Sup Ct review denied

Home rule, particular matters

Statutory provision (ORS 243.752) which binds parties in public employe labor disputes to arbitrators decision does not violate this section. Medford Firefighters Ass’n v. City of Medford, 40 Or App 519, 595 P2d 1268 (1979), Sup Ct review denied

City had authority to enact ordinance criminalizing prostitution, but statutes pertaining to sentencing and prostitution preempted mandatory minimum penalties under city ordinances as there were no such mandatory penalties under statutes. City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 71 Or App 289, 692 P2d 162 (1984), aff’d 300 Or 490, 714 P2d 220 (1986)

Application of statute prohibiting employment discrimination to invalidate city charter provision limiting hiring age of firefighters did not violate “home rule” amendments to Oregon Constitution. Civil Service Bd. of Portland v. Bureau of Labor, 298 Or 307, 692 P2d 569 (1984)

Home Rule Amendments pertain to initiative, referendum and electoral rights but, at least facially, do not have independent bearing on when cities may be created. Aloha Advisory Comm. v. Port. Metro. Area LGBC, 72 Or App 299, 695 P2d 941 (1985), Sup Ct review denied

It is only when city charter describes city boundaries that boundary change constitutes charter amendment, and where city’s charter did not describe its territory, but provided for boundary changes in “accordance with state law,” state law changing city’s boundary did not constitute amendment to city charter. Donaldson v. Lane County Local Govt. Bdry. Comm., 93 Or App 280, 761 P2d 1349 (1988), aff’d 310 Or 168, 795 P2d 549 (1990)

ORS 199.534 does not violate this section, at least with regard to cities whose charters do not describe their boundaries. Mid-County Future Alternatives v. City of Portland, 95 Or App 556, 770 P2d 604 (1989), aff’d 310 Or 152, 795 P2d 541 (1990)

City of Portland ordinance prohibiting any person from carrying concealed knife other than short-bladed pocket knife was preempted by ORS 166.240. City of Portland v. Lodi, 308 Or 468, 782 P2d 415 (1989)

Where city indecent exposure ordinance did not require culpable mental state but similar state statute did, no conflict existed because legislature did not intend to permit conduct not prohibited by statute. City of Portland v. Jackson, 316 Or 143, 850 P2d 1093 (1993)

Specific exclusion of passive resistance from scope of ORS 162.315 prohibits local ordinance against hindering police officer by failing to leave area when given lawful order. City of Eugene v. Kruk, 128 Or App 415, 875 P2d 1190 (1994)

City may not make crime of conduct similar but not identical to conduct state treats as noncriminal violation. State v. Tyler, 168 Or App 600, 7 P3d 624 (2000)

Civil Service for Firefighters Act established under ORS 242.702 to 242.824 may not be applied to home rule municipality. McGee/Gymkowski v. Civil Service Board of the City of Portland, 211 Or App 149, 154 P3d 135 (2007)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Constitutionality of statutory formula for computing the annual levy under a serial levy approved as a percentage of true cash value, (1971) Vol 35, p 793; authority of home rule counties as substantially equal to that of home rule cities, (1972) Vol 36, p 131; effect of city charter contract limitations, (1974) Vol 37, p 172; state power to limit city’s taxing power, (1975) Vol 37, p 367; validity of requiring that a city collect for the state a surcharge on building fees, (1975) Vol 37, p 856; State Public Records Law requirements concerning governing body votes preempting city charter secret ballot provision, (1979) Vol 39, p 525; constitutionality of Act creating State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation, (1979) Vol 39, p 587; creation of Oregon Medical Insurance Pool does not violate Article XI, section 2 of Oregon Constitution, and its private management does not transgress constitutional prohibitions on delegation of governmental power to private entities, (1989) Vol 46, p 155; local government authority to force evacuation of fire-threatened areas, (1996) Vol 48, p 27

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 10 WLJ 103 (1973); 10 WLJ 373 (1974); 13 WLJ 383 (1977); 15 WLR 311 (1979); 67 OLR 111 (1988); 69 OLR 305 (1990); 70 OLR 969 (1991); 40 WLR 225 (2004); 85 OLR 815 (2006); 87 OLR 939 (2008)

Art. XI, Section 3

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 70 OLR 257 (1991); 40 WLR 225 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 4

NOTES OF DECISIONS

This section does not authorize payment of attorney fees on appeal of a condemnation proceeding. State Hwy. Comm. v. Stockhoff, 18 Or App 943, 524 P2d 1240 (1974)

City’s order to relocate utilities without compensation for construction of LRT system was not taking under this section or Article I, section 18. Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 300 Or 291, 711 P2d 119 (1985)

Municipalities qualify as persons. City of Keizer v. Lake Labish Water Control District, 185 Or App 425, 60 P3d 557 (2002), Sup Ct review denied

“Corporation” includes both public and private corporations. City of Keizer v. Lake Labish Water Control District, 185 Or App 425, 60 P3d 557 (2002), Sup Ct review denied

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 40 WLR 225, 627 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 5

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 40 WLR 225 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 6

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Executive Department correctly ruled that investment of deferred compensation moneys in trust that would invest in corporate stock would violate this section which prohibits state ownership of stock because [former] ORS 243.400 et seq. provide that state owns moneys until they are distributed to employe. ICMA Retirement Corp. v. Executive Department, 92 Or App 188, 757 P2d 868 (1988), Sup Ct review denied

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Time deposits in mutual savings bank or state or federal savings and loan association of state moneys from Oregon Excess Fund, (1980) Vol 40, p 495; Investing deferred compensation in variable annuity contracts, (1983) Vol 43, p 186; government contracts with trusts for pooling and investing deferred compensation funds, (1985) Vol 45, p 27; acquisition of judgment debtor interest in mutual fund recover moneys owed state, (1994) Vol 47, p 173

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 67 OLR 122 (1988); 70 OLR 257 (1991); 40 WLR 225 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 7

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Prohibition goes to “liability” as well as “credit” and “debt” of state; consequently, statutory provision seeking to impose “moral obligation” upon future legislatures to pay from general funds in event of deficiency in named account was void. Gibson v. Smith, 20 Or App 264, 531 P2d 724 (1975) Sup Ct review denied

A statute creating a “moral” obligation on the state to appropriate general fund money to pay for revenue bonds does not violate this section. Walsh Constr. Co. v. Smith, 272 Or 398, 537 P2d 542 (1975)

The Oregon Building Authority Act, Oregon Laws 1975, chapter 280, is invalid under this section. Martin v. Oregon Bldg. Authority, 276 Or 135, 554 P2d 126 (1976)

Where chapter 1032, Oregon Laws 1989, allows state to borrow funds in excess of $50,000 limitation on “debts or liabilities” but legislature is not legally required to make appropriations to repay obligations, inclusion of moral make-up clause does not make obligations “debt” and law does not violate debt limitation of this article. State ex rel Kane v. Goldschmidt, 308 Or 573, 783 P2d 988 (1989)

Where chapter 1032, Oregon Laws 1989, allows state to borrow funds in excess of $50,000 limitation on “debts or liabilities” and does not create “liabilities” if lenders’ security interests are limited, upon nonpayment, to an amount equal to unpaid balance on obligations at time of nonpayment, law does not violate debt limitation of this article. State ex rel Kane v. Goldschmidt, 308 Or 573, 783 P2d 988 (1989)

Chapter 1032, Oregon Laws 1989, does not authorize unconstitutional lending of state’s credit because it does not permit investment or otherwise promise public funds for benefit of private persons or to promote private schemes. State ex rel Kane v. Goldschmidt, 308 Or 573, 783 P2d 988 (1989)

Contractual obligation to provide pension benefits undertaken at time employee is hired does not create unconstitutional future debt obligation because benefits are paid into pension trust fund contemporaneously with service. Oregon State Police Officers’ Assn. v. State of Oregon, 323 Or 356, 918 P2d 765 (1996)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Constitutionality of compensation to victims of violent crimes, (1975) Vol 37, p 449; constitutionality of Highway Fund advance to Multnomah County to acquire golf course, (1975) Vol 37, p 460; constitutionality of indemnity provision, (1975) Vol 37, p 911; contractual power of the State, (1976) Vol 38, p 340; Oregon participation as prime sponsor under Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, (1981) Vol 41, p 322; state creation of debt or liability to pay for construction of office building by entering into lease-purchase or installment-purchase agreement, (1981) Vol 41, p 423; constitutionality of state administration and operation of CETA programs as prime sponsor, (1981) Vol 42, p 5; potential liability of state in administering federal Joint Training Partnership Act, (1983) Vol 43, p 199

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 67 OLR 118 (1988); 70 OLR 257 (1991); 40 WLR 225 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 8

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Oregon participation as prime sponsor under Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, (1981) Vol 41, p 322; Potential liability of state in administering federal Joint Training Partnership Act, (1983) Vol 43, p 199

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 70 OLR 257 (1991); 40 WLR 225 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 9

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Where city contracted to build public facilities which would be managed by private hotel, facilities were for public purpose so no violation of this section was shown. Thunderbird Motel v. City of Portland, 40 Or App 697, 569 P2d 994 (1979), Sup Ct review denied

This section did not prohibit local government from entering valid, arm’s length transaction, even though private company may benefit. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. City of Eugene, 627 F2d 966 (1980)

Policy and objective of energy conservation plan of Eugene Water and Electric Board which contained provisions for financial assistance to consumers constituted public purpose and was therefore valid under this section. Nicoll v. City of Eugene, 52 Or App 379, 628 P2d 1213 (1981), as modified by 53 Or App 528, 632 P2d 502 (1981)

Participants’ Agreement among PUDs, cities and WPPSS did not violate this section. DeFazio v. WPPSS, 296 Or 550, 679 P2d 1316 (1984)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Validity of using county funds for a contributing membership in a private association formed to promote shipping, (1972) Vol 35, p 1185; authority of local government to invest public funds in variable annuity contracts for purpose of funding deferred compensation plans, (1978) Vol 39, p 47; power of county to allocate portion of county’s revenue sharing funds to private nonprofit corporations, (1979) Vol 40, p 11; Public utility low or zero interest loan programs or grants to finance energy conservation measures for customers, (1980) Vol 41, p 238; Distribution of state moneys when all land within city is owned by private party, (1983) Vol 44, p 20; government contracts with trusts for pooling and investing deferred compensation funds, (1985) Vol 45, p 27; prohibition against county library association stock ownership and participation in dividend reinvestment plan, (1997) Vol 48, p 351

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 70 OLR 257 (1991); 40 WLR 225 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 10

NOTES OF DECISIONS

County purchase of Glendoveer Golf Course was not “debt” in violation of debt limitation of this section where there were sufficient funds on hand for payment of total contract balance of $600,000. Terry v. Multnomah County, 279 Or 127, 566 P2d 878 (1977)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Constitutionality of Highway Fund advance to Multnomah County to acquire golf course, (1975) Vol 37, p 460; authority of Marion County to borrow money on security of Senator Hotel, (1980) Vol 40, p 422; Constitutionality of consortium of counties participating as prime sponsor under CETA, (1981) Vol 42, p 12

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 40 WLR 225 (2004)

Art. XI, Section 11

NOTE: Former section 11 was repealed June 19, 1997; present section 11 adopted in lieu

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Before 1997 repeal

[Former] ORS 334.262, limiting amount which educational service district may levy for its own budget, support, instructional and resolution services, does not violate this section. Petersen v. IED Columbia Co., 7 OTR 460 (1978)

For purposes of constitutional limitations, tax levies for payment of bonded indebtedness are treated separately from tax levies for normal operating expenses. Smith v. Colton School Dist. No. 53, 10 OTR 295 (1986)

Under this section and applicable statutory provisions, any transfer from defendant’s general fund to its debt service must be deemed to be made from property tax resources to extent they exist. Smith v. Colton School Dist. No. 53, 10 OTR 295 (1986)

Tax increment financing procedure did not violate this section which prohibits taxing unit’s use of power of levy to raise more revenue than its tax base. Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev., 305 Or 595, 756 P2d 13 (1988)

Taxing district may formalize intent to levy less than full amount of tax base. Coultas v. City of Sutherlin, 318 Or 584, 871 P2d 465 (1994)

Subsequent to 1997 adoption

To be “casualty loss,” reduction in value must have element of accident or uncontrollable force. Chart Development Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 17 OTR 170 (2003)

“Retired property” refers to property voluntarily retired or removed from service or use by owner. Chart Development Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 17 OTR 170 (2003)

In general

For purposes of determining maximum assessed value, “real market value” means assessed real market value shown on tax roll, not actual real market value. Ellis v. Lorati, 14 OTR 525 (1999)

Where taxing district imposes taxes on property for public school system purposes, tax that district assesses against urban renewal incremental portion of property value must be categorized as assessed for government operations other than public school system. Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or 101, 36 P3d 954 (2001), modified 334 Or 11, 45 P3d 107 (2002)

Maximum assessed value for “each unit of property” is based on combined value of all property in property tax account. Flavorland Foods v. Washington County Assessor, 334 Or 562, 54 P3d 582 (2002)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS

Before 1997 repeal

Constitutionality of crediting to the county general fund interest earned from investment of unsegregated money held by county treasurer, (1971) Vol 35, p 1020; tax levies after dissolution of a district, (1972) Vol 35, p 1059; dissolution of insolvent metropolitan service district, (1972) Vol 35, p 1117; effect of “consolidation” and “merger” of special districts on their tax bases, (1973) Vol 36, p 314; certification of levies upon voter approval, (1975) Vol 37, p 801; 1 1/2 percent property tax limitation and limitation on increases in tax rates, (1984) Vol 44, p 85; 1 1/2 percent property tax limitation, (1986) Vol 45, p 59; Oregon Constitution does not provide levying authority for new district created by consolidation, (1989) Vol 46, p 234; when districts merge and boundaries of surviving district are expanded, surviving district’s tax base is increased by amount equal to equalized assessed valuation of taxable property in annexed territory for fiscal year of annexation multiplied by millage rate within tax base of annexing unit for fiscal year of annexation, plus six percent of such amount, (1989) Vol 46, p 234; application of Article XI, section 11b of Oregon Constitution, to this provision, (1990) Vol 46, p 388; Tax base and territory of reorganized Education Service Districts, (1994) Vol 47, p 58; applicability to enterprise zone and key industry properties, (1997) Vol 49, p 6

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS

Before 1997 repeal

67 OLR 115 (1988)

Subsequent to 1997 adoption

87 OLR 717 (2008)

Art. XI, Section 11a

NOTE: Section 11a was repealed June 19, 1997; present section 11 adopted in lieu

NOTES OF DECISIONS

This section recognizes reliance on local property taxes and directs school districts to meet state standards with property taxes; therefore, plaintiffs failed to state claim that current system of public school funding violates section 3, Article VIII. Coalition for Equitable School Funding, Inc. v. State of Oregon, 311 Or 300, 811 P2d 116 (1991)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Application of Article XI, section 11b of Oregon Constitution, to this provision, (1990) Vol 46, p 388

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 67 OLR 116 (1988); 28 WLR 259 (1992)

Art. XI, Section 11b

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Amusement device tax is privilege tax and not tax on property subject to limitations of this section. Alien Enterprises, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 12 OTR 126 (1992)

Water improvement district formed under ORS chapter 554 is not “governmental unit” within meaning of this section and its fees are not within limits of this section. Comeaux v. Water Wonderland Improvement Dist., 12 OTR 132 (1992), aff’d 315 Or 562, 847 P2d 841 (1993)

This section is not invalid under Equal Protection Clause of United States Constitution. Savage v. Munn, 12 OTR 145 (1992), aff’d 317 Or 283, 856 P2d 298 (1993)

City storm drainage user charge based upon amount of “impervious surface area on a property” is within limits of this section. Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 12 OTR 194 (1992), aff’d 314 Or 600, 841 P2d 633 (1992)

Tax increment revenues are “taxes” within meaning of this section. In re City of Portland, 12 OTR 208 (1992), aff’d 314 Or 178, 838 P2d 568 (1992)

To qualify as taxes imposed to pay bonded indebtedness authorized by constitution, authorizing provision must explicitly empower or sanction incurring of bonded indebtedness. City of Portland v. Smith, 314 Or 178, 838 P2d 568 (1992)

Section 1c, Article IX, does not explicitly empower or sanction incurring bonded indebtedness. City of Portland v. Smith, 314 Or 178, 838 P2d 568 (1992)

ORS 305.580 preempts general refund provision of ORS 311.806 where government mistakenly classifies tax with regard to this section. Smith v. Multnomah County Board of Commissioners, 12 OTR 377 (1993), aff’d 318 Or 302, 865 P2d 356 (1994)

Fee that required person responsible for paying water utility charges for property to pay fee or person with right of occupancy to pay fee was not tax within meaning of this section, because fee was not imposed on property or upon property owner as direct consequence of property ownership. Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 851 P2d 595 (1993); City of Portland v. Atwood, 13 OTR 136 (1994)

“Routine obligations of ownership” refers to common, ordinary or usual obligations within control of individual property owner. Lake v. Lane County, 13 OTR 194 (1994), aff’d 321 Or 572, 902 P2d 90 (1995)

Exclusion for taxes to pay bonded indebtedness for capital construction or improvements does not require that governmental unit imposing tax be identical to unit that issued bonds. Lake v. Lane County, 13 OTR 194 (1994), aff’d 321 Or 572, 902 P2d 90 (1995)

Real market value and estimated real market value on same date are identical except where property is subject to depreciation or waste. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 13 OTR 252 (1995)

Definition of “local improvement” as providing special benefit only to specific properties does not modify traditional meaning of term so as to exclude projects that also confer general benefit to community. Ester v. City of Monmouth, 322 Or 1, 903 P2d 344 (1995)

Definition of real market value requires that assessment be reduced for property damage occurring during tax year. Shatzer v. Dept. of Revenue, 13 OTR 436 (1996), aff’d 325 Or 211, 934 P2d 1119 (1997)

“Capital construction or improvements” means construction or improvements that add value beyond a single operating period or that add to accumulating assets of government units and includes major repairs and acquisition of personal property. Gill v. Beaverton School District 48, 14 OTR 25 (1996)

Categorization of taxes by taxing district according to intended use does not limit actual use of taxes to provision of services within that category. Glenn v. Morrow County Unified Recreation District, 14 OTR 344 (1998)

Categorization of levy follows categorization of taxing district unless sole purpose of levy is for services falling within different category. Glenn v. Morrow County Unified Recreation District, 14 OTR 344 (1998)

“Actual costs incurred” in designing, constructing and financing project includes both direct and indirect costs. Martin v. City of Tigard, 14 OTR 517 (1999), aff’d 335 Or 444, 72 P3d 619 (2003)

Definition of “local improvement” as having assessment capable of payment over 10-year period does not conflict with requirement of ORS 223.215 conditioning taxpayer’s ability to pay assessment over 10-year period. Martin v. City of Tigard, 14 OTR 517 (1999), aff’d 335 Or 444, 72 P3d 619 (2003)

Whether taxes are properly categorized as revenues for public school system or revenues for government operations other than public school system depends on purpose for which revenues are dedicated, not function of taxing district whose rate is source of tax. Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or 101, 36 P3d 954 (2001), modified 334 Or 11, 45 P3d 107 (2002)

Petition under ORS 305.583 seeking determination whether tax assessment or other charge is subject to limitations of this section must be timely filed where local government makes specified type of classification or characterization notwithstanding that assessment or charge may not be imposed until later time. ZRZ Properties, LLC v. City of Portland, 18 OTR 284 (2005)

Where levy provides for mixed use of proceeds, each portion of proceeds must be individually categorized according to intended use. Urhausen v. City of Eugene, 18 OTR 395 (2006), aff’d 341 Or 246, 142 P3d 1023 (2006)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Application of this provision to other provisions of Oregon Constitution, and to various statutory provisions (1990) Vol 46, p 388

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 28 WLR 259 (1992)

Art. XI, Section 11f

NOTE: Section 11f was repealed June 19, 1997; present section 11 adopted in lieu

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Tax base and territory of reorganized Education Service Districts, (1994) Vol 47, p 58

Art. XI, Section 11g

NOTE: Section 11g was repealed June 19, 1997; present section 11 adopted in lieu

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Expected effect, implementation and operation of section upon passage, (1996) Vol 48, p 67; determination and application of various limitations and restrictions on tax rate, (1997) Vol 48, p 241; what constitutes new or additional tax levies, (1997) Vol 48, p 241; types of property subject to rate limitations, (1997) Vol 48, p 241

Art. XI, Section 11i

NOTE: Section 11i was repealed June 19, 1997; present section 11 adopted in lieu

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Expected effect, implementation and operation of section upon passage, (1996) Vol 48, p 67

Art. XI, Section 12

NOTES OF DECISIONS

This section distinguishes public utility districts from municipalities. Emerald PUD v. PP&L, 76 Or App 583, 711 P2d 179 (1985), Sup Ct review denied

Where ORS 35.235 confers power of eminent domain on people’s utility districts, it does not violate this section of Oregon Constitution. Emerald PUD v. Pacificorp, 100 Or App 79, 784 P2d 1112 (1990), Sup Ct review denied, on reconsideration 101 Or App 48, 788 P2d 1034 (1990)

People’s utility district does not possess exclusive right to provide service within boundaries of district. Douglas Electric Cooperative v. Central Lincoln People’s Utility District, 164 Or App 251, 991 P2d 1060 (1999), Sup Ct review denied

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: This section does not prohibit the Legislative Assembly from restricting a district’s exercise of its constitutional powers, (1987) Vol 45, p 209

Art. XI, Section 13

NOTES OF DECISIONS

This section was enacted to enable receipt of funds under Federal Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964, and not to relieve mass transportation companies acquired under this section from any pension obligations. Rose City Transit Co. v. Portland, 18 Or App 369, 525 P2d 325 (1974), aff’d as modified 271 Or 588, 533 P2d 339 (1975)

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 51 OLR 54 (1971)

Art. XI, Section 14

NOTES OF DECISIONS

City or town authority under section 1, Article IV, or section 2, Article XI of Oregon Constitution, to amend its charter is subject to plenary authority of state legislature and to regulatory authority of metropolitan service district under this section. City of Sandy v. Metro, 200 Or App 481, 115 P3d 960 (2005)

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 85 OLR 815 (2006)

Art. XI, Section 15

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Application to public employee retirement benefits, (1999) Vol 49, p 152; state indemnification of local governments for payments based on government regulations restricting use of property, (2001) Vol 49, p 284

Article XI-A

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Use of tax exempt notes to obtain moneys for Oregon War Veterans’ Fund, (1981) Vol 41, p 449; buydown mortgages, (1981) Vol. 42, p 174; restoration to veteran’s bond sinking fund of moneys previously transferred to General Fund, (1988) Vol 46, p 78, clarified (1989) Vol 46, p 245

Art. XI-A, Section 1

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Giving first mortgage on property to DVA satisfies constitutional requirement for “secured repayment” but mortgage may be displaced by subsequent liens given statutory priority. Director of Veterans’ Affairs v. Vickery, 299 Or 315, 702 P2d 1070 (1985)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Authority of Director of Veterans’ Affairs to expend money in Oregon War Veterans’ Fund or Oregon War Veterans’ Bond Sinking Fund for acquisition or construction of building to house Department of Veterans Affairs or conducting feasibility study for this purpose, (1979) Vol 39, p 695; Public Health Service officers’ eligibility for veterans’ loans, (1979) Vol 40, p 138; repayment of War Veterans Fund moneys transferred to General Fund, (1988) Vol 46, p 78, clarified (1989) Vol 46, p 245

Art. XI-A, Section 3

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Availability of veteran’s farm or home loan from Oregon War Veteran’s Fund to World War II veterans who have already received such loans, (1979) Vol 40, p 5; Public Health Service officers’ eligibility for veterans’ loans, (1979) Vol 40, p 138; eligibility of Women’s Air Forces Service Pilots as federal civilian employe to receive loan, (1980) Vol 41, p 33; rights of officers under ROTC program to veterans’ home and farm loans before leaving active military service, (1981) Vol 42, p 113; repayment of War Veterans Fund moneys transferred to General Fund, (1988) Vol 46, p 78, clarified (1989) Vol 46, p 245

Art. XI-A, Section 4

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Department of Veteran’s Affairs may enforce increased interest rate for farm and home loans, but may not do so by unilaterally increasing veteran’s monthly mortgage payment. Associated Oregon Veterans v. DVA, 300 Or 441, 712 P2d 103 (1985)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Repayment of War Veterans Fund moneys transferred to General Fund, (1988) Vol 46, p 78, clarified (1989) Vol 46, p 245

Art. XI-D, Section 2

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Use of funds for generation of electric energy by state, private parties, and to contract for purchase of electrical energy, (1981) Vol 42, p 59

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 67 OLR 107 (1988)

Art. XI-D, Section 3

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Proper administration of State’s powers to develop electrical energy, (1977) Vol 38, p 722

Art. XI-E

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Loans from bond sales or other obligations for rehabilitation and reforesting privately-owned lands, (1974) Vol 36, p 767; repayment procedures for reforestation bonds, (1980) Vol 41, p 173

Art. XI-F (1)

NOTES OF DECISIONS

State Board of Higher Education acting through Southern Oregon State College did not exceed its authority in providing housing, food and transportation to groups attending Shakespearean Festival though such services stemmed from use of facilities constructed or renovated with bonds issued under provisions of this section. Jansen v. Atiyeh, 87 Or App 617, 743 P2d 765 (1987), Sup Ct review denied, as modified by 89 Or App 557, 749 P2d 1230 (1988)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Authority of Department of Higher Education to anticipate future space needs in building construction and to rent to other state agencies space not currently needed, (1972) Vol 36, p 121; state institutions of higher education paying carpooling employes’ parking fees, (1974) Vol 36, p 1015; issuing of bonds for remodeling, (1974) Vol 37, p 85; use of General Fund moneys to pay physical plant operating costs for nonrevenue producing space in student centers, (1974) Vol 37, p 215

Art. XI-G, Section 1

Art. XI-H

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Environmental Quality Commission authority to lend funds for planning to metropolitan service district, (1972) Vol 35, p 1117; use of funds for research necessary and prior to planning, (1972) Vol 36, p 86; authority of the Environmental Quality Commission to grant pollution control funds for preliminary research planning and acquisition of real estate for solid waste disposal facilities, (1972) Vol 36, p 242

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 5 EL 516 (1975)

Art. XI-H, Section 3

NOTES OF DECISIONS

This section suspends debt limitation of section 10, Article XI, and does not imply general grant of power to borrow funds other than in manner described in municipal corporation’s enabling legislation. Metropolitan Serv. Dist. of Portland v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 28 Or App 113, 558 P2d 1264 (1977)

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Environmental Quality Commission authority to lend funds for planning to metropolitan service district, (1972) Vol 35, p 1117

Art. XI-H, Section 6

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Environmental Quality Commission authority to lend funds for planning to metropolitan service district, (1972) Vol 35, p 1117

Art. XI-K

ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Applicability of amount limitation to bond debt guarantees, (2001) Vol 49, p 275