Chapter 647
647.005
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Meaning
of term “trade name,” as used in Code of Professional Responsibility of Oregon
State Bar, is not same as meaning of that term under this section. In re
Shannon/Johnson, 292 Or 339, 638 P2d 482 (1982)
647.035
LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 62 OLR 158 (1983)
647.095
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Where
ordinary purchaser was not likely to confuse antifreeze of plaintiff and
defendants, all of same yellow color and packaged in F-style jug, there was no
likelihood of injury to plaintiff’s business reputation and no ground for
injunctive relief. Union Carbide Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 619 F Supp 1028
(1985)
647.107
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In
order for trade name or trademark to be diluted so as to require granting of
injunctive relief under this section, trademark or trade name must be
distinctive. Airwick Ind. v. Alpkem Corp., 384 F Supp
1027 (1974)
Where
defendant used word “Wedgwood” in retirement apartment business located
partially in marketing area of plaintiffs’ residential real estate development
and marketing business, and trial court found word “Wedgwood” to be synonymous
with plaintiffs’ activities in real estate, plaintiffs were entitled to
injunctive relief under this section. Wedgwood Homes v. Lund, 58 Or App 240,
648 P2d 393 (1982), aff’d 294 Or 493, 659 P2d
377 (1983)
“Dilution”
may refer to injury to value of mark caused by actual or potential customer
confusion, or to injury caused by use which detracts from the reputation
associated with the mark or to any diminution in uniqueness and individuality
of the mark caused by another’s use of similar mark. Wedgwood Homes v. Lund,
294 Or 493, 659 P2d 377 (1983)
Where
ordinary purchaser was not likely to confuse antifreeze of plaintiff and
defendants, all of same yellow color and packaged in F-style jug, there was no
likelihood of injury to plaintiff’s business reputation and no ground for
injunctive relief. Union Carbide Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 619 F Supp 1028
(1985)
Where
trade name is not inherently distinctive, plaintiff must prove that name has
acquired secondary meaning to extent that identification with plaintiff is
primary significance in minds of consumers. Ernst Hardware Co. v. Ernst Home
Center, Inc., 134 Or App 560, 895 P2d 1363 (1995), Sup Ct review denied
LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 14 WLJ 245 (1978);
62 OLR 157 (1983)